ABSTRACT
This chapter offers evidence of a positive effect of participation in standard- setting on motivation. It begins with an application of the theories about “participation in decision-making” on the budget case. It shows how participation was measured. For studying participation, it is necessary to distinguish between budget or financial standard-setting and technical or non-financial standard-setting Only participation in financial standard-setting has a direct effect on the motivation to fulfill the budget : of all quantified aspects of a budget system studied, this is the one with the strongest effect on motivation.
External reference points for standards are important for motivation : this is shown through a number of quotations from interviews. Authority of persons higher in the hierarchy also obviously plays a role in standard-setting. Attitudes towards authority were measured for the line interviewees, and these appear to influence the effect of participation on motivation. The data also show that low participation in budget setting does not automatically lead to a desire for more. Participation must be experienced before it becomes attractive. In the plants studied, with one exception, first-line management did not participate in budget setting. The issue is raised which level of management should participate in the setting of a budget.
Participation in the setting of technical standards has no apparent overall effect 174on motivation, but it is considered a prerogative of any manager. Managers’ job satisfaction is affected if they do not participate enough in the setting of their technical standards.
Standard setting too has a clear game aspect; this is demonstrated through quotations.
Finally, the BUROMAT situation is presented as a case study of high budget participation and low participation in the setting of technical standards.
