ABSTRACT
J. N. Keynes (FL, p. 16) expands the definition that a. concrete name is the name of a thing, whilst an abstract name is the name of an attribute, by saying that" a concrete name is the name of anything which is regarded as possessing attributes, i.e. as a subject oj attributes; while an abstract name is the name of anything which is regarded as an attribute of something else, i.e. as an attribute oj 8ubjects.'~ But on p. 18 he mentions that attributes may themselves be the subjects of attributes, as in the sentence" unpunctuality is irritating," and says that "Unpunctuality, therefore, although primarily an abstract name, can also be used in such a way that it is, according to our definition, concrete." But when" names which are primarily formed as abstracts and continue to be used as such are apt also to be used as concretes, that is to say, they are name8 of attributes which can themselves be regarded as possessing
