ABSTRACT
It is commonly assumed that the existence of a balance of power, namely a situation whereby the belligerents are approximately even in strength,l is the most desirable for the small state and, in particular, the small neutral. 'Since the neutrality of the small European states is essentially a function of the balance of power,' argued Hans Morgenthau on the eve of World War II, 'the upset of this balance in Europe and its replacement by a hegemonic or semihegemonic relationship among the European nations cannot fail to endanger ... the neutrality of these states.'2 A similar stand was presented in 1945 in an article in the prestigious journal, Foreign Affairs, which argued that the major lesson from Sweden's experience in World War II was that the neutrality of small states depended on the existence of equilibrium between the great powers. 3 This conclusion was shared by the veteran Swedish diplomat Gunnar Hagglof, who held that the basic condition of neutrality is the existence of a balance of power. 4-
Why does the balance of power constitute a favourable setting for the preservation of neutrality? Apparently this viewpoint is rooted in the belief that' Noone state has ever been strong enough to eat up all the rest; and the mutual jealousy of the great powers has preserved even the small states, which could not have preserved themselves.'5 In other words, the small state draws its security from the reciprocal neutralisation of the great powers. In peacetime, any great power will aspire to prevent a small state, and particularly a neutral state that is unaligned with either side, from being included within the sphere of influence of the rival power. 6 And what is true in peacetime is doubly true in wartime when the scales are more or less balanced between belligerents and expenditure of effort by one of them on a secondary objective is liable to hinder its
achievement of the primary goal. The historical record, however, seems to belie such views. World
War II produced not a few instances in which small states (such as Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland) found themselves in environments where one of the belligerent powers enjoyed decisive dominance and still managed to survive unscathed, while states, such as Belgium, Holland and Norway, located in regions characterised by a balance of power between the belligerents were overrun.
