ABSTRACT

The future East Asian international order is likely to be significantly shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of regional states and relevant external powers. China features prominently in this process given its immense material power, national aspirations, geographical location, and entangling geostrategic and territorial contentions with many other players in the region. In recent years, there has been growing awareness among the Chinese elite that the ocean is becoming more important for Chinese national interests in the long run, e.g. China's great resurgence and long-term economic prosperity. 1 In 2003, the total production value of China's

marine economic sector exceeded RMB 1 trillion for the first time and in 2005 that figure rose to RMB 1.7 trillion. From 2001 to 2005, China's oceanic economy increased by 11.1% annually. In 2004, China publicized its national guidelines on marine economic development, which called for the goal of making China a strong maritime power. 2

It is therefore necessary and useful to examine China's policy on maritime affairs and its role in the dynamic development of maritime order in East Asia. To this end, many analysts focus on the growth of China's naval power to try to understand China's role in the emerging regional maritime order. The mainstream view is a negative one, predicting that China's growing naval power will destabilize the region in the future. Some scholars in this school of thought explicitly argue that China's naval power could more likely lead to conflicts in East Asia.3 Examining China's underwater aspirations and capabilities, Goldstein and Murray conclude that 'submarines are emerging as the centerpiece of an evolving Chinese quest to control the East Asian littoral' .4 Others attempt to read into the minds of Chinese strategists. They believe that influential strategists in China look to Alfred Thayer Mahan's seapower theory for guidance on maritime strategy. They predict that given this kind of mindset, Beijing is likely to 'regard the South China Sea much as Americans once regarded the Caribbean Sea: as a preserve where commercial and political imperatives demand dominant naval power' .5 Logically, the policy implication of these assessments is that the USA, perhaps together with its allies in East Asia, should be constantly prepared to deter and thwart a more assertive China in the future.