ABSTRACT
China has become a primary mover of regional economic and security cooperation in East Asia since the mid-1990s when Beijing began to shift from a single minded preference for bilateralism to embrace multilateralism. An enthusiastic member in regional institutions such as ASEAN + 3, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and East Asian Summit (EAS), Beijing also launched the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and hosted the Six-Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. What are the driving forces and
approaches of China's participation in regional cooperation and institution-building? Seeking answers to this important question, this paper argues that China's strategic shift is motivated first of all by China's domestic interests to create a peaceful peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability, particularly its frontier security and prosperity. The realist interests to enhance China's position in competition with other major powers in the region, particularly Japan and US, also play an important part in China's strategic calculation. These interest calculations have also shaped China's preference for an informal approach, emphasizing voluntarism and consensus building rather than legally binding resolutions, toward regional cooperation. This soft approach is a major barrier for many regional institutions to move beyond the stage of talking shops to effectively resolve conflicts in the region.
