ABSTRACT
Introduction With the growth in China's economic and, to a lesser extent, military strength, it has become a nearly daily occurrence to hear media outlets, scholars, and diplomats express the view that China is now a global power and, indeed, a world 'leader'. For several years now, for example, C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute has said the world now faces a de facto 'G2'; the China-United States axis is now the most important in the world. In the Asian sphere, China's leadership is seen as crucial on a wide variety of issues-North Korean nuclearization and proliferation, economic growth and stability, health, and development, to name a few. Indeed, China's rise has been seen as re-shaping the whole Asian order. 1
At this point, such observations are at least as much aspiration as reality. Indeed, the party that is perhaps most reluctant to characterize China as a 'leader' is the Chinese leadership itself. There are many possible reasons why China has not yet grown into a leadership role that so many expect of it. Some explanations are rooted in China's absolute power-still weaker than the United States. Some explanations are rooted in China's interests and ideology, which (contrary to what many would expect given the strains of nationalism expressed in the country) suggest that China should bide its time. Not to be forgotten are the institutional and bureaucratic factors at work, factors that in the past have been shown to hinder the smooth making of foreign policy and exercise of leadership. All of these explanations-power, interests, ideology, and institutional constraintsoverlap and make it hard to prioritize explanations. The purpose of this article is to serve as a reminder of China's domestic institutional constraints on leadership at a time when its participation and anticipation of its role has skyrocketed. The article lays a framework with some evidence from recent East Asian trade organizations.
