ABSTRACT
The preceding chapter introduced Husserl's conception of the new science of phenomenology and outlined some of the main results in his analysis of the structure of consciousness. This chapter explores, in closer detail, the basic theory and methodology developed in Husserl's system of phenomenology. By practicing a special method of reflection on our experience, “bracketing” the question of the existence of the world we experience, Husserl explicates the structure of intentionality, wherein consciousness intends or represents an object in a certain way: through a given meaning or “noema,” which takes its place in a “horizon” of meaning, in which the object is “constituted” in consciousness as having various possible properties. At the same time, Husserl uses that model of intentionality to explicate his method of reflection on the meaningful content of experience. Husserl's theory of intentionality — featuring structures of noema and horizon — distinguishes phenomenology, in his view, from empirical psychology. For Husserl, phenomenology is part “phenomena” and part “logic,” and their integration is carried out in the details of his theory of intentionality. Our task now is to explain Husserl's revolutionary notions — intentionality, noema, horizon, constitution — in as simple a way as possible while laying out the key terms and their use in his articulation of phenomenology.
