ABSTRACT
Corporatist institutions, one of the main elements shaping the reform context, lie at the heart of business-state relations in Brazil, as discussed in Chapter 3. Although there have been many changes in institutional options and behavioural patterns since the passage of port reform legislation, the essential underlying corporatist features remain relevant to understanding Brazilian business-state relations into the twenty-first century. The battle for institutional modernisation of Brazilian ports – policy formulation and implementation phases – provides ample evidence for this. This chapter focuses on how structure/institutional features as well as agency/actorspecific choices and behaviour posed major obstacles to the implementation and consolidation of port reform legislation.1 It notes processes of incremental institutional change after the critical moment of legislative approval, but also stubborn opposition to institutional modernisation. It focuses on examining progress in the first decade of reform implementation, coinciding with the presidencies of Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). The chapter first considers the overall institutional context and then analyses actor-specific obstacles to port reform implementation. Thus, it analyses how attitudes associated with a closed economy and corporatist institutions delayed reform generally and how labour opposition, bureaucratic obstruction and business difficulties thwarted reform specifically. The next chapter discusses how business and state actors adapted their attitudes and behaviour in the longer term, eventually leading to the replacement of Law 8630/1993 with Law 12,815/2013. The new law continued to reflect (1) the changing circumstances and needs of an economy that was ever more integrated into global markets; and (2) logistics infrastructure requirements for competitiveness in the global economy. Brazil was not unique in experiencing thorny problems when implementing port reform. However, the large divergence in intent and practice, in policy output and reform outcomes, especially in the earlier stages of implementation, was particularly disappointing to the advocates of reform.
Significantly, at least in terms of my argument, the blame for the slow implementation and divergence from reform objectives was fairly evenly distributed among different actors involved in the port sector. This chapter clearly demonstrates how corporatist institutions awarded privileges and fostered opposition in port labour; created sources of power among bureaucrats who resisted their withdrawal; and fragmented business interests and generated apathy in the broader business community. In contrast, to the entrenched institutional structure, the behaviours of some economic actors (state and societal) appeared to be shifting in response to changing external conditions. My research showed that opening the economy, including the impacts of globalisation, liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation, fostered a growing interest in the efficiency of ports because of their impact on the competitiveness of firms. As Ambassador Barbosa noted, ‘[f]irms are increasingly aware that they must either modernise or die’.2 Moreover, once the impacts of market opening and a changing economic context were assimilated (which took almost a decade), the initial resistance to reform was steadily worn down. Interestingly, workers and union leaders were among the first to clearly understand that their employment and income depended on the success of competitive firms. Significantly, it was Law 8630/1993 that brought home the advantages of dismantling traditional corporatist structures, and the lessons of the AEI experience went on to shape the evolution of business-state relations in the early twenty-first century. In 1997, Deputy Delfim Netto (PDS-SP) confidently pointed out:
