While the limits to the neoconservative grand strategy became increasingly apparent during Bush’s second term, it was in the context of the financial crisis that erupted at the end of the Bush presidency coming on the heels of what many perceived as the Iraq debacle, and a resulting general sense of weakening of U.S. power relative to rising powers such as China, that Obama’s call for “change we can believe in” became so resonant not only with regard to domestic but also to foreign policy. However, rather than representing any fundamental change, the Obama administration set out to readjust U.S. grand strategy in terms of its means while remaining fully committed to its longstanding ends – upholding the exceptionalist claim to global hegemony, with the stated aim of U.S. military power underwriting “global security” and supporting the opening of markets around the globe, and – protestations to the contrary notwithstanding – expanding the War on Terror on several fronts, even if adjusting its focus and means. At the same time, seeking to restore and preserve American global “leadership for the coming decades,” Obama not only focused on restoring the economic foundations of American power in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also “rebalanced” American grand strategy to Asia in recognition of the global power shift taking place and the potential threat emanating from China to the Open Door. As such, what came to be called the “Asia pivot” became a central element of what we here identify as Obama’s strategy of “imperial restoration.”