ABSTRACT
According to Zosimus, Constantine destroyed the security of the frontiers by removing most of the troops and stationing them in the cities, ‘thus both stripping of protection those being molested by the barbarians and subjecting the cities left alone by them to the outrages of the soldiers’ (2.34.1-2). As Tomlin notes (1987,119-20), however, this was a deliberate misunderstanding of late Roman strategy by a critic of this emperor. From the late third century onwards, it had become increasingly difficult for the frontiers to be held against the numerous, and often concurrent, attacks. A screen of garrisons was therefore provided in the frontier zone, which would in theory ‘check minor incursions, and hinder major invasions by holding fortified towns and supply-bases, and strongpoints of all kinds along the lines of communication’ (ibid., 119-20). This, in theory, would hinder the enemy’s supplies, better defend the civilian population, and grant the mobile troops more time to gather. In practice, however, this theory had several weaknesses since, to a large degree, its effectiveness relied on speed of communication and the ability of the mobile army to respond quickly (ibid., 120); Procopius records numerous occasions where cities were captured either because of a lack of communication between the commanders, or that support was not sent in time, or was simply not available.
