ABSTRACT
In the traditional concept of limited war derived from Clausewitz, policy restricts the use of force through various methods-such as military objectives, rules of engagement, target lists, or caps on troop numbers-that are designed to ensure that limited ends are pursued with limited means. But real political wars do not always constrain military force. When leaders have force in reserve, they can calculate that an escalation is necessary to assert values that are only indirectly related to the war’s rational objective, bowing to what Clausewitz called the natural course or tendency of war toward uncontrolled violence (Gacek 1994). Take for example the issue of American commitment during the Vietnam War. On February 27, 1968, faced with widespread public concern about the meaning of the Tet offensive, President Lyndon B. Johnson told an audience in Dallas that “our unshakeable and untiring resolve” was the key to lasting peace:
There must be no betrayal of those who stand beside us. There must be no breaking of our trusted commitments. When we give our word we must mean what it says. America’s word is America’s bond.
