ABSTRACT
In recent years, a great deal of experiment, publication, and debate has been engendered by the question of implicit knowledge (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1987a, 1988; Broadbent, Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986; Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Lewicki, 1986; Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988; Mathews et al., 1989; Perruchet, Gallego, & Savy, in press; Perruchet & Pacteau, in press; Reber, 1967; Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980; Sanderson, 1989; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1988). Some experiments seem to show that people can learn to perform actions without being able to give verbal accounts of them. However, many investigators question this, and argue that the testing of verbal knowledge has been inadequate. When I listen to these discussions, they remind me of an interchange that George Mandler and I had in the 1970s, about recall and recognition. My guess is that the newer disagreements are about the same psychological issue. In any case, however, they certainly illustrate the same problems of misunderstanding and communication. People involved now should take heed to what George was saying then.
