ABSTRACT
The structure of interdependence defining a social dilemma applies to a wide range of relationships among people, where the central feature is the incompatibility of individual and collective interests. Use of shared fish stocks, provision of public radio, and accessing the internet are all seemingly disparate cases which present individuals with a choice of acting to maximize one’s own gain, or taking less. Despite predictions of collective disaster resulting from the pursuit of individual self-interest, humans have devised many and varied ways to ensure behavior that favors the collective. Some of these solutions emerge unplanned and unrecognized (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Macy, 1995). Others may arise through implicit or explicit acknowledgment of the need for constraint (Keohane & Ostrom, 1995, p. 2). Norms, practices, sets of rules and institutions may be implemented to alter the reward structure, in recognition of the unreliability of elementary cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Ostrom, 1990; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 1984; Yamagishi, 1986b).
