ABSTRACT
A great deal of discomfort can be involved in the fact that there is no fixed human nature as such, and that one cannot appropriate a permanent identity. The Self, Jean-Paul implies, does not endure in strict correspondence with the consciousness one has of it. Empirically, the relationship between Self and Other has predominantly occurred in the latter mode. This conflict mode between Self and Other characterizes the works of both Hegel and Sartre. Thus, Sartre rejects the view which Heidegger adopts, namely, that coexistence, the mit-sein, is the foundation for the relationship between Self and Other. Consciousness constitutes a relationship. It is constituted as a relationship with an Other whose inescapable presence has the greatest meaning for the Self. This Other judges, confers an identity and often affirms or denies the freedom of the Self. In its look, or gaze, the Other reveals its advantage over the Self.
