ABSTRACT
A philosopher who understands that moral units, such as persons, are not substances but modes of substance—I mean that they are incidental to a certain movement in deeper things—will not be disinclined to admit any degree of unselfishness to be possible, even to utter self-sacrifice. These unitary roving creatures, whom we suppose to be obviously interested in themselves, have no existence of themselves; they spring from what they know not of, and they enact whatever purposes their unknown source may have put into them together with life. These purposes may therefore be quite other than their own preservation or private benefit; yet if they have clear souls, and are wise, they will find their happiness in their natural function, however disinterested this may be. Since they are addressed to it initially, by the constitution of the seed from which they grow (for I am not speaking of forced sacrifices), they can achieve integrity and happiness only by loving their congenital function, and adoring the ulterior end which their existence serves. There may be animals capable of acting and willing only for the sake of other animals, for whom they pave the way; or they may blindly supply a link in some process itself without a purpose.
