ABSTRACT
Discursive acts typically are constituted in such a way that certain formal structures that inform the emergent interaction can be seen in them. A discursive act by itself offers the possibility of varied responses and interpretations from an external world, which creates for the self the opportunities to enmesh its life with that of others. In the web of discourses in which humans live, every moment is constituted by the use of one form of discourse or other. Their use reflexively influences the self and the interaction. These forms may be nebulous and defy classification; it is however, possible to delineate some of the forms by which this web is constructed and to specify the consequences for self and interaction. These forms of discourse—analogous to Bakhtin’s (1986) speech genres and Lyotard’s modes of discourse (1989)—have elicited discussion in their guise as speech acts. Lyotard himself, discussing what he terms the “pragmatic aspect” of language use, following J.L. Austin, describes utterances as being either “performatives” or “prescriptions.” The former are described as acts in which the effects of the utterance “coincide with its enunciation” (1988: 9), and the latter, “modulated as orders, commands, instructions, recommendations, requests, prayers, pleas, etc.,” are acts in which “the sender is clearly in a position of authority, using the term broadly: that is, he expects the addressee to perform the action referred to” (1988: 10). Lyotard adds certain refinements to Austin’s positions and Wittgenstein’s theses about “modes of discourse being language games—that is, actions defined by specific rules of practice and usage.” First, the rules that define a language game “do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between players.” Second, notes Lyotard, “even an infinitesimal modification of one rule alters the nature of the 132game.” Finally, he argues that “every utterance should be thought of as a ‘move’ in a game” (1988: 10).
