ABSTRACT
Hiding a large-scale nuclear program is extraordinarily difficult. The logic of deterrent stability will be in place only when the newly-nuclear state has enough weapons that some survive an attack, as well as surviving means to deliver warheads against an attacker. Under zero nuclear weapons (ZNW) it would also be much harder for a person or group to assemble a private nuclear arsenal. Experience contradicts claims that clandestinity is easily maintained. In the late 1990s and early 2000s alarmists of the US Republican Party's Cheney-Rumsfeld wing warned of instant enemies armed with nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, enemies who shortcut difficulties by acquiring complete systems from abroad. In the early 2000s some specialists suspected North Korea, Iran, and Libya of wanting nuclear weapons. Taiwan's experience illustrates that a clandestine program can arouse suspicions, or be exposed through an intelligence initiative of an ostensible patron and ally.
