ABSTRACT
The absolute sine qua non of denuclearization and sustainable zero nuclear weapons is persuasive verification. In turn, ongoing verification of zero nuclear weapon must incorporate provision for on-site inspection. There would be no need for "verification" if states were secure in their futures, confident—on sound grounds—that no other state or movement would endanger their security. Verification responds to fear—fear that another state, violating its agreements, will seek advantage, or even overpower its agreement partner. Customarily, formal arms control and disarmament agreements stipulate how each party may verify that the other is in performance. Objections to "anywhere, anytime" inspection reflect real concerns, but concerns for which there should, in principle, be political solutions if the agreements are highly-valued. If verification could be accomplished by allowing access, the "satisfaction rule" has it that the party desiring assurance should have every access it requires for verification it judges adequate.
