ABSTRACT
Defenders of the zero nuclear weapon regime can hope that a defector will come knocking on their door, a "walk-in" with notice of the plot and enough specifics—places, people—to enable prompt suppressive action. A denuclearization designer could approach the problem in the following way. The need is to make whistle-blowing look like innocent communication. If a sufficient number of widely-accessed sites required that requests for some of their pages be encrypted, and if the decrypted calls to those pages were parsed again in search of "hotline" addresses, "hotline" messages could be filtered into the hands of weapons inspectors. Plotters must consider that a whistle-blower could entrust a single friend with the salient message, deliverable by a dissociated celfone. A designated "hotline" site ensures that every incoming message will be taken seriously. It could reveal a clandestine nuclear program. Effective "hotline" sites are vulnerable to false alarms, just as false fire alarms vex municipal fire departments.
