ABSTRACT
Many believe that nuclear weapons—absent an effective counter-threat—can be used to force political concessions. The process to broad political simultaneity must proceed on two lines: obtaining agreement among the nuclear states, and establishing adequate internal agreements sufficient that each government can keep the terms negotiated with the other states. The Exploratory Denuclearization Talks (XDT) would require that one official in each participating state be charged with responsibility for this action, and have a small staff for support. It is a cliche, but no less true, that simultaneous decision will be possible when each of the participating states sees zero nuclear weapons (ZNW) as in its interest. Technical simultaneity will require planning and skillful work, sustained over a considerable period of time, but the difficulties are far more tractable than those encountered in seeking political agreement. The agenda of the XDT will turn on considering participants' concerns that in some respect ZNW will—on balance—harm their interests rather than serve them.
