ABSTRACT
President Nasser was well aware, as his own statements show, that by decreeing the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to shipping, by massing his troops in Sinai, by concluding a pact with Jordan and by inciting Iraqi units to join the Jordanian troops, he was challenging Israel. The leaders of that country had said and repeated that the blockade of Eilat or the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan would constitute a casus belli. To resort to the language of the philosophers, Israel and her neighbours were living in a state of nature, where strength and cunning prevail. The nature of the battlefield ensured a huge advantage to whoever struck first. On May 26, the Soviet Union and the United States brought pressure to bear on President Nasser not to make the first move towards war. Both President Johnson and President de Gaulle, each in his own manner, gave it as his explicit aim to 'hold back' Israel.
