ABSTRACT
This book is a study of meaning relations in abstract areas of the lexicon. Meaning relations shed light on the structure of the lexicon and are especially helpful when dealing with the abstract, less accessible parts of the lexicon, where concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘similarity’, ‘difference’, ‘negativity’, and ‘norm’ are found. People use words like ‘truth’ or ‘difference’ to convey ideas. They probably have some idea of what these words mean, but what these words refer to in the world, their status in the mental lexicon or in actual verbal interaction, is not very clear. Unlike ‘monkey’, ‘car’, or even ‘fear’ or ‘support’, there is no direct, ostensive way to point to the reference of these words; that is, there is no way to designate the objects or events in the real world to which they refer. Abstract words appear to have a special status, and understanding their meaning is a challenge. Is there a class of words for abstract ‘concepts’? If so, how can this class be determined? What does this class include? What is its structure? How is it constructed? Finally, what is its place in the lexicon?
