ABSTRACT
Economists like to think of themselves as the purveyors of the best analyses of rational human behaviour. They are quite happy to let psychologists study the thoughts and acts of the irrational, of the clinically depressed, of the delusional, as long as their monopoly on rational behaviour is recognised. When others point out that most people harbour inconsistent preferences, act in a manner that is frequently at odds with their own perception of self-interest, entertain ridiculous beliefs etc., economists nod approvingly but then immediately retort that their subject matter is the ‘ideal’ rational self. And that what makes their models of this über-rational homo economicus relevant is the ‘fact’ that markets have a tendency, through some Darwinian process, of eliminating behaviours that diverge from the rational choice of a homo economicus. In their mindset, the greater one’s exposure to market competition, the more one begins to resemble the ideal type rational agent that they, and their models, take for granted. Even if most of us fall short of homo economicus’ capacity for rational choice, claim the economists, we cannot help but tend to that ideal type the greater our exposure to the cut and thrust of market societies.
