Overall, most of the human rights enshrined in international treaties could be interpreted as supporting nomadism. As this book has demonstrated, despite the lack of the clear and direct integration of nomadism within the sphere of human rights law, it is nonetheless possible to argue for an interpretation of human rights law that can include nomadism. This includes the aforementioned right to free movement, property rights, or cultural rights. While a greater focus on nomadism is needed, ultimately human rights law with its universalism and indivisibility could offer a solid platform upon which to integrate a nomadic approach to law. However they are clear limitations, linked to the fact that nomadic peoples do not yet appear as identifi able subjects of human rights law. Hence, it is not so much that human rights law is fundamentally sedentarist, but rather that human rights law has not yet challenged the international legal order that favours sedentariness, residency, and immovability. Nomadism, or the right to be nomadic, has not yet been directly addressed and remains an invisible issue within human rights law. Despite the lack of a specifi c focus on nomadism, and a clear statement regarding the right of the nomads to maintain and enjoy a nomadic way of life, it appears from this book that the specifi c legal frameworks developed for minorities and indigenous peoples probably offer the most suitable platform to include nomadism. The few commentaries on nomadic peoples’ human rights have mainly been made under the headings of minority and indigenous peoples’ rights. Section 3 examines whether the failure to include nomadism within the main human rights framework could be compensated by the emerging developments that are taking place under the aegis of minority and indigenous peoples’ rights.