ABSTRACT
Emotions, as social constructions and judgments of value, form an essential part of individual and institutional systems of ethical reasoning. Reason, emotion and moral appraisal are all instrumental in shaping the discursive processes through which institutions such as law seek to determine and validate their practices and principles. To support this claim, recent research within the area of affective neuroscience is used to contest the traditional Cartesian dualist model. From this perspective, the division between reason and passion, or cognition and emotion, is based on a misconception; whereas in fact the physical body acts as a theatre for both the intellect and emotions. Accordingly the oral and written tradition of law operates in a sensory environment where other communicative forms and feelings continually augment, adapt, reinforce and purposefully challenge each other. The chapter seeks to repudiate the myth of judicial dispassion by exploring the many complex ways in which the emotions are implicated in courtroom decision-making and in framing legal principle and policy.
