ABSTRACT
At the time of writing, insurgency is perhaps the most pressing issue in strategy. Coalition forces are still embroiled in a protracted counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan, nine years since the fall of the Taliban regime. As a strategic option insurgency has a long pedigree. History is replete with cases of uprisings aimed at overthrowing the existing order. However, the twentieth century witnessed a substantial development in the theory of both insurgency and COIN. Men such as Mao and Gaulga, both of whom were theorists and practitioners, gave these forms of warfare a more developed, structured appreciation. Despite such efforts, the practice of irregular warfare has often not matched the conceptual heights to be found in works of theory. This is particularly the case with COIN, which still appears to present a steep challenge for those involved. This chapter will define the problem of insurgency, before attempting to understand the reasons for relatively poor performance in COIN.
