ABSTRACT
Three areas of development may be distinguished in theoretical welfare economics, (1) that which, aiming at complete generality, seeks to develop the formal apparatus necessary for attaining a unique social optimum. The set of conditions determining the boundary of production possibilities, or of the utility possibilities, is the more acceptable product of this approach, no rules for the selection therefrom of a unique social optimum, other than purely tautological ones, being provided. However, although recent contributions within this area have elaborated optimal conditions to cope with indivisibilities, nonconvexity, and other such awkward possibilities, more prominence has been given to discussions about the theoretical possibility of constructing, under certain circumstances, an apparatus of social choice to enable the unique social optimum to be reached. Though it lends itself to some fascinating philosophical speculation one must be inordinately optimistic to expect welfare propositions to emerge in the foreseeable future from these investigations.
