ABSTRACT
The preceding chapters have offered a normative foundation for ICL, one that exposed a need for a separate domain of law for crimes of a particular nature, heinous and political, and examined the contemporary core crimes of current international statutes, as well as a possible additional one in the crime of terrorism. This current state of justice for mass atrocity embraces holding individuals criminally liable for their actions. This concentration on retributive justice, though, seems to overlook the fact that the reason for prosecution and punishment in this context is underexplored in theoretical discussions concerning ICL and international relations.1 Although theories of punishment have been extensively debated concerning domestic law, discussions about the aim of punishment for the commission of international crime is strangely deficient in theoretical debates. The key question, ‘What can justify formal, legal punishment imposed by the state on criminals?’ is examined with a focus on the role of the state and its relationship to its citizens and the role of criminal law in this context. It is unreasonable, however, to simply assume that the rationale behind punishing domestic offenders is identical to that which justifies punishment for perpetrators of exceptional international crimes.2 Reputed purpose for domestic punishment may not, in fact, make sense in the context of these crimes.
