ABSTRACT
The preceding chapters examined the distinct nature of international crimes and why a legal response to these acts, in the form of prosecution and punishment, is valuable to the well-being of social and political living by virtue of its expressive value. Individual prosecution, though, is a tricky scheme to assign to crimes of this character. International crimes are generally crimes of a collective nature. Crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, most specifically, are endeavours of great magnitude,1 but also war crimes, when committed ‘as part of a plan or policy or as a part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’ (Rome Statute: Article 8.1, Chapeau), essentially require a collectivity (active or supporting) to transpire. These crimes cannot, for the most part, be committed by one person acting alone.2 They require the involvement of many people, some with intent, many in fear themselves, caught up in a movement of violence, anxiety and hatred. The actions of individuals play a significant role in the accomplishments of the collective, but so, too, does the general state of the collective have a very serious effect on the frame of mind and actions of individuals. This inter-reliance especially needs to be heeded when examining for what individuals ought to be held responsible. It plays a great role in the most important questions to a project of holding individuals criminally accountable: Does it make sense to talk of the criminal responsibility of individuals in the context of international criminal activity? How is individual liability determined if the results of these criminal endeavours would not have been realized except that many individuals participated, acting together in collaboration? For what can we, morally and practically, hold individual participants accountable?
