Looking back on the previous chapters, I cannot escape a feeling that everything that I have said is obvious. Certainly there is nothing philosophically innovative in it. Though there are academic philosophers who subscribe to religious beliefs, the criticisms which I have rehearsed against the traditional arguments for the existence of God are standard ones. Likewise the accounts of why scientifi c method is a reliable source of knowledge, and why scientifi c understanding does not exclude familiar beliefs about the distinctive characteristics of human beings, seem to me to be fairly uncontroversial. Most moral philosophers would agree that morality is logically independent of religion, and though the debates between subjectivism and objectivism, and between utilitarianism, Kantianism and other positions remain contested, my discussion covers familiar ground. Moreover, the feeling of obviousness is not just a matter of philosophical familiarity. I am also inclined to think that the broad position which I have defended is largely a matter of common sense.