Should we all be fighting terrorism? According to the Danish and US governments the answer is “yes, we should,” but when turning to corporate actors the answer becomes less straightforward. Where Danish and American governments have attempted to responsibilize private companies in counterterrorism, such strategies have had very different resonances in the business communities of the two countries. This book has contributed to the debate on security governance by showing that companies in different countries interpret the relation between national and corporate security differently. Unlike most studies on terrorism and security governance, however, the object of enquiry has not only been to understand the security governance of governments but also to understand how private companies engage in such politics through their management of the terrorist threat. This study has revealed how security is an essentially contested concept with multiple meanings, all of which have been used actively to politically negotiate security responsibility and to write and rewrite the definition of political versus private authority. The complex relationship between “national security,” “corporate risk,” “corporate security” and “corporate safety” proved to be absolutely central in drawing and constituting the boundaries between the private and the public, between corporate and national security. Finally, this study has had a comparative focus. It may come as no surprise that one finds diversity when conducting parallel discourse analytical studies in different countries. However, this comparative analysis of Denmark and the United States did in fact reveal how these nation-states share very similar understandings of the terrorist threat and the methods required for combating it (“broad spectra cooperation” and partnerships). Using Helmut Willke’s term “Supervision State,” I have attempted to describe this understanding of security management through partnerships: Supervision State designates a state that has a vision (even a super vision), but also a state which, in order to manage these new and dispersed threats, must empower civil society and private business to selfregulation – it must facilitate rather than legislate, educate rather than dictate. While the security governance in Denmark and the United States seems to work on very similar terms and has adopted the same strategy of responsibilization, the respective business communities have responded very differently. The busi-

ness communities in the two countries simply interpret security responsibilities and authority differently; they hold different conceptualizations of what constitutes normal private and public security responsibility. In short, these two countries appear to represent two distinct cultures of corporate security. The remainder of this conclusion will highlight some of the differences in the political and corporate governance of terrorism in the United States and Denmark. The political challenges and potentials one can contemplate based on such a comparative perspective are evaluated. As argued throughout this book, a comparative analysis not only provides opportunity to examine the particularities, it also increases our understanding of the many different opportunities for political maneuvering. Subsequently, I address some of the democratic challenges and corporate dilemmas emerging from such a comparative study of Danish and American corporate security governance. Finally, the chapter considers the future of responsibilization policies as means of security governance.