Introduction

In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling advanced the “broken windows” theory, which laid the groundwork for a reinterpretation of the decline of U.S. cities in the postwar period. Instead of focusing on economic restructuring, deindustrialization, suburbanization, and shrinking government budgets as indicators of urban decline, Wilson and Kelling argued that the behavior of “disorderly” people in urban space affected the desirability of cities in profound ways and that urban centers had become undesirable because city officials had not adequately dealt with this problem. They described “disorderly” people as “not violent people, nor necessarily criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, and the mentally disturbed.” Ultimately, Wilson and Kelling contended that if tolerated, social disorder could easily mutate to serious crime and that the authorities had the responsibility of tackling minor incivilities with the same rigor that they fought dangerous crime. The “broken windows” theory elevated order-maintenance into one of the most important functions of city governance. ¹