ABSTRACT
In considering Kristeva's concept of a herethics, however, I also show that the account of mothering in "Stabat Mater" is itself not entirely consistent with the terms of the herethics Kristeva proposes. In particular, certain aspects of the representation of the child and the mother-child relationship in "Stabat Mater" are not consistent with a herethics' demand for differentiation in sameness and the recognition of the discursively constituted subjectivity of the other. About this I raise two questions: Is this inconsistency a function of the psychoanalytic framework of "Stabat Mater," and can it be resolved? I argue that the child and the mother-child relationship can be represented in ways more consistent with a herethics by bringing Kristeva's account of mothering into relationship with certain elements of Ruddick's account of maternal practice. But even so, questions about both the psychoanalytic framework of "Stabat Mater" and the development of ethical and political theories based on psychoanalytic accounts of women's difference persist. Most importantly, do psychoanalytic accounts of women's difference risk the recuperation of essential motherhood, given that some versions of psychoanalysis suggest that women's becoming mothers is biologically determined, socially functional, and/or required for women's maturity, self-development, and happiness?
