ABSTRACT
The earliest evidence for incipient socio-economic complexity in the Horn of Africa becomes visible during the early-mid-first millennium bc in the northern Ethiopian and Eritrean highlands. Although obviously a problematic term, social complexity is betokened by a number of archaeological indicators. The appearance for the first time of formal inscriptions indicative of a very marked social hierarchy is a prominent motif; other features include the emergence of distinctive monumental architecture; a seemingly implanted and apparently monolithic cosmology based upon southern Arabian – specifically Sabaean – influences; a more complex system of settlement patterning, and a diverse material culture which although appearing to be shaped through extra-regional contact, references a strong local substratum (Munro-Hay 1993). In short, a very different archaeological footprint becomes visible in the landscape of the northern highland region, yet this trend is not yet archaeologically apparent in the highlands further south, nor in the desertic and coastal zones to the south-east and east, hence the narrow geographic emphasis of this chapter. At the outset a number of broad observations may be made which
frame the context for causes and consequences of social complexity in this region. In the first place – in comparison with other areas of northeastern Africa along the Nile corridor and also westwards into the Sahel – the emergence of complex societies in this region is a relatively retarded phenomenon. Even using the most liberal estimates from what is an admittedly very narrow archaeological database, it is hard to
argue for any manifestations of social complexity earlier than the period c.900-700 bc. This contrasts with the situation in the middle Nile region and the Nile Delta. A second issue – and arguably the most important within the context of the central question of formation of identity – is the influence of extra-regional contacts upon events in the region. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the sense of the ‘de-Africanisation’ of Ethiopia derives in part from traditional constructs of this period under discussion (as is reflected by the quote at the head of the chapter), and the use of (now archaic) terminology to describe the ‘pre-Aksumite period’ (which itself is clearly an illogical and unsatisfactory term) as an ‘Ethio-Sabaean’ or ‘South Arabian’ phase (the terminology was defined by Francis Anfray 1968). Uncritical culture-historical assessments of migrationist-diffusionist
influences from across the Red Sea during this period have played a key role in the externalisation of Ethiopian identity (e.g. Isaac and Felder 1988: 71), yet this is also part of a wider African debate. In many regions, cultural or social innovation has been ascribed to foreign influences; the study of the causes and consequences of early urban societies in the west African Sahel is a key example (McIntosh and McIntosh 1993), and we might also invoke equally well known examples from the historical literature on the Middle Nile worlds and also the Swahili coast. In emphasising the indigenous phenomenon, we must be wary of falling into the sort of evolutionary, teleological trap which has clouded the picture of the development of food-producing economies in Africa. This approach demands a critique of the social trajectory, a model which envisages the evolutionary progression from hunter-gatherer, via more complex levels of social organisation, to the level of the state, or extended to include the supra-regional state: the empire. What concerns us here explicitly is the problem of the ‘chiefdom’, an intermediate-level society which would appear to be the ‘best fit’ for the material discussed in this chapter (Schneider 1976a uses this term in connection with this period). The ‘pre-Aksumite’ ‘chiefdom’-level society would be traditionally viewed as a ‘necessary’ intermediate stage between the farming societies discussed in the last chapter, and the more complex state-level organisation of the Aksumite state and empire which we will encounter in the next chapter. Broadly, the definition of a classic chiefdom emphasises a quantitative
scalar difference between tribal and state regions, a population ruled over by a single king or chief, with an economy based upon surplus production and redistribution of wealth. As such there is a level of social differentiation which is theoretically mirrored in material culture organisation (Earle 1987). As usual these neat criteria for the archaeological recognition of these phenomena cannot often be made to fit the data, and the African picture, as recently critiqued by Susan McIntosh (McIntosh 1999) is more
variable, complex and nuanced than previously thought. Three key points need to be made in this regard. In the first place the label ‘chiefdom’ carries certain preconceptions
and primitivist implications; the use of the term middle-ranking (or segmentary) society is more appropriate. Second ethnographic studies have shown that whilst many African societies do possess very finegrained systems of social organisation (based upon combinations of age grades, gender, lineage and so on) these networks are often not reflected in material culture organisation. In many cases socially complex societies are culturally invisible as there is a strong emphasis upon the acquisition and maintenance of social rather than economic power. It is also noticeable that where economics do enter the equation, the emphasis – especially in pastoralist societies – is upon the accumulation of a given resource (in this case cattle): quantity as opposed to quality. Third we should disabuse ourselves of the notion of some form of teleological social continuum; as Norman Yoffee (1993) emphasises, in many cases the African ‘chiefdom’ does not inevitably develop into a fully formed state. The mechanism for the origins of state-level polities cannot be reduced to a simple neo-evolutionary developmental scheme, the emphasis should perhaps be placed more upon the cyclic nature of society, a theme with which we shall become very well acquainted (Schmidt 1996). Without placing the accent wholly upon a diffusionist-migrationist scenario, the complex nature of the developments and debates outlined in this chapter demands a consideration of the regional picture, with special emphasis upon south-western Arabia and the Gash Delta of the eastern Sudanic steppes.
