ABSTRACT
In the absence of reliable information from international inspectors (except for some elements of North Korea's nuclear programme), our assessment of North Korean capabilities relied heavily on official government assessments produced by interested outside powers, such as the United States and South Korea. Recognising the limits on what these governments knew and on what they could say in public, we tried to explain the methodology for these official assessments. In the absence of definitive information, they tended to be analytical judgements based on evaluations and estimates of capabilities and motivations, rather than hard conclusions based on conclusive evidence. Moreover, intelligence agencies naturally leaned toward 'worst case' assessments. With caution, we also catalogued purported leaks of intelligence information and information from defectors and refugees from North Korea, emphasising that in many cases the accuracy and reliability of this information could not be confirmed. Finally, we considered the actions and words of the North
Preface
Korean government itself, which had an interest in manipulating the outside world's perceptions of its capabilities, often to invent or exaggerate capabilities that do not exist.
