ABSTRACT
Foucault is more than generous in his acknowledgments, on the issues here in question and numerous others, of his indebtedness to the thinking of Nietzsche. And Nietzsche, as part of his repeated expressions of admiration for the thinkers of the Renaissance, gives high praise to the “bold and light-hearted skepticism of a Montaigne,” contrasting the latter’s outlook and temperament with the “insipid backwoodsman’s problems” that preoccupied Martin Luther (Will to Power, I, 93: 57; hereafter WP followed by book, section, and page numbers. And cf. Human All Too Human, I, 1: 12; hereafter HATH followed by volume, section, and page numbers). There is therefore reason to expect substantial continuities to emerge from explorations of and engagements with these three thinkers. But just as we found significant differences between Foucault and Montaigne, so we will find that the nuances and inflections of Nietzsche’s thinking about freedom, discipline, and resistance depart importantly from those of Foucault and Montaigne. These differences should help us to enlarge and refine our own reflections concerning these topics. Moving through a number of issues and topics of concern to all three thinkers, I explore some of the salient continuities and commonalities but intersperse comments concerning respects in which Nietzsche’s positions-as one would expect in relations among thinkers all of whom are committed perspectivalists-diverge from the reflections thus far discussed.
