ABSTRACT
X has been seen, the decay of good government owed littleto any fundamental troubles in the body politic: it sprangfrom no deep-seated social disruption, but only from the weakness of the crown. A king strong and independent enough to re-assert the inherent powers of the English crown would find the means all ready to hand, only waiting to be used. Henry VII was such a king, but it is not easy to say in what his strength lay. Certainly he did not, like the king of France and the sovereigns of Spain, dispose ofan armed force on which to raise his pre-eminence; but then, unlike them, he did not have to create a united state out of militarily powerful particles, so that his need of an army was the less marked. Henry VII possessed the only siege-train of artillery in England, and though these guns were never used at home they had some value as a deterrent. But when rebellion had to be suppressed, Henry VII, with the military conservatism which characterised his house, preferred to rely on the bowmen of the shire levies and the forces raised by his supporters; that he could do so is in itself a sufficient commentary on the kind of opposition he had to overcome. The guard of 200 yeomen which he instituted on his accession (supposedly after the example of France) was never more than a ceremonial body useful in adding dignity to the royal person and in policing the court. Henry promoted the interests of his nascent navy, himself building six king's ships and encouraging the development of the merchant marine on which he dependend in time of war, but the fleet was of little importance in the suppression of internal troubles. If Henry VII had depended for his success on physical force he would not have lasted many years.
