Parliament

That the supremacy was parliamentary, depending either for its first authority or for its exercise on parliament, has already been denied; yet all through the 1530S every important step was embodied in statutes made by king, lords, and commons-for it must be remembered that the king was and is as much a part of parliament as are the COlnnlons. T~le accepted interpretation of this use of statute is distinguished by a kind of enthusiastic vagueness sometimes deviating into rhapsody.! It argues that Henry VIII's

turning to parliament proved his supreme political genius; that his deliberate decision to take the nation 'into partnership' was the most momentous step in the rise of parliament; that parliament, and especially the commons, were asked to endorse matters by enactment in order to make acceptance of the changes easier and advertise the unquestioned unity of king and people. It claims both much too much and, in some respects, rather too little. Thi~ becomes clear when we ask what parliament actually did and distinguish between the preambles and the enactments of statutes. Parliament 'does' only what is set out in the enactment. The preamble may explain and just~fy; it may-as in the act of appeals -outline a whole political philosophy, or-as in the act of supremacy-accept as given vast novel assertions; but it can never record what parliament has done. In the politicallegisiation of the 1530S the form is quite plain: the preamble of the statute declares as fact some aspect of the Cromwellian revolution (as that England is an empire, or that the king rightly is supreme head), while the enactment draws administrative conclusions from this fact (that therefore appeals outside the realms must be forbidden, or that therefore the king ought to have certain ta~es and how they are to be collected) and appoints penalties for transgressors. The acts of this time are declaratory in that they set out in their preambles as already in existence what the government really wishes the nation to accept; their preambles are propaganda. The acts are also administrative orders, laying down procedure and practices. But above all the acts are penal: they decree punishments. Parliamentary statute cannot create the supremacy which is conceived of as derived from God, but it alone can make the supremacy enforceable at law, in the law courts. Until parliament has decreed that certain activities (such as the denial of the supremacy or the seeking out of appeals at Rome) are criminal and carry appointed penalties, there is no way in which the supremacy can be enforced on the country, especially on the laity: the king has no means of forcible and extralegal coercion, and only statute can add felonies and treasons, involving loss of life or member, to the body of law. This disposes of the notion sometimes encountered that Henry could have established his supremacy by proclamation: had he wished to do so he would have had to give to proclamations powers they had never had.