ABSTRACT
I n th~ 19905 a consensus appeared to be emerging in the United States that notwithstanding the ncar-universal acceptance of the Nuclear Non -proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treat (CTBT), it is unrealistic to expect that India and Pak istan will give up their nuclear weapons option in the near future. ' The nuclear tests conducted by Ind ia and Pakistan in May 1998 have had a mixed effect on this consensus. To most observers, the tests meant a worsening of the regional security situation, and a clear indication that the provisions of the CTBT arc essentially unverifiable. The surprise Indian tests were seen, above aU, as representing an intelligence failure. Others, however, believe that the tests only formalized the strategic reality that has prevailed in South Asia at least since the 19805. These analysts also believe that the tests underscored yet again the inability of the international community to solve the problem of proliferation solely by focusing on the supply-side strategies of technology denial. Now that Indian (and possibly Pakistani) capacity to weaponize at will has been publicly and unambiguously demonstrated, a range of options is being explored to restore the nuclear order. The United States, as the leader of the multilateral non-proliferation efforts, is understandably heavily involved in this effort.
