ABSTRACT
T he most obvious benefit from the underground nuclear tests conducted by India at Pokharan on May II and 13, 1998, is that Indo-US relations will be underwritten by a certain sensc of realism. Up until now, bilateral relations were being conducted by both countries at different levels, which made a common meeting ground between the world's largest and greatest democracies extremely difficult. Realism has been the basis of US security policy, and this has been reflected part icularly in its approach toward secu ring international agrct':ments on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Ind ia , o n the other hand, sought to secure its interests in the mult ilau:ral arena in negotiations on WMD by raising the debate to a moral high point. Put simply, from a national standpoint, the United States has conducted its foreign policy on WMD with a posi tive sense of creating agreements that would perpetuate its advantages and minim ize the concessions that it was r equired to make. The overriding priority that underlay these efforts was to allow the United States to play its global role. In contrast, India engaged in multilateral diplomacy and negotiating tactics that seemed to prevent the legitimization of the existing realities.
