ABSTRACT
Since 11 September 2001 the United States Army has found itself involved in several
major counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns. They include major campaigns such as
the ongoing conflict with Taliban supporters and al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan,
and the insurgency in Iraq against Ba’ath remnants, foreign fighters and dissident
Shi’ite groups. Elsewhere in the world, American military forces are assisting
allied nations facing insurgents. The army is training and supporting Philippine
government forces fighting an insurgency by radical Muslim factions in the southern
islands. In Colombia, the American military has been engaged for more than a decade
in training and equipping government forces fighting a combination of Marxist insur-
gents and paramilitary factions. Contrary to the Pentagon’s 1990s vision of future
high-tech conventional wars, the focus of the American military today, and for the
foreseeable future, is not on conflicts with conventional states, or operations to deter-
mine the control of outer space. Instead, we are fighting the kind of war for which the
US military, and specifically the army, is least prepared – a series of protracted insur-
gencies against a variety of non-state enemies.
