ABSTRACT
Given Max Weber's still widely touted characterization of Buddhism as an "anti-political status religion" I and Melford E. Spiro's insistence that Buddhism is normatively concerned solely with the soteriological needs of individuals conceived in other-worldly terms,2 questions naturally arise about the credibility of engaged Buddhism's appeal to the Buddhist tradition for support of its social and political activities. It is not unreasonable to ask, for instance, whether or not engaged Buddhist social ethics can legitimately be called "Buddhist" at all. As Daniel B. Stevenson asks in regard to American forms of Buddhism generally, "Is there a point at which institutional and conceptual change begins to threaten the integrity of that tradition or to stretch it beyond recognition?"3 Are they not, as Christopher S. Queen has asked, something akin to Buddhist "heresies" clothing essentially liberal Protestant notions of social service and activism in the language and symbols of Buddhism? After exploring the central characteristics of socially engaged Buddhism, I will address the question of whether or not its social ethics may be considered anything more than nominally Buddhist.4
