The ‘Dutch approach'

Literature on the history of Dutch counterterrorism often refers to a distinctive ‘Dutch approach’. This generally denotes the prevention of violence and integration of radical protest in the existing system on the one hand, ¹ and, in the case of genuine terrorist actions, the authorities' attempt to limit the damage by means of delay, negotiation and endless talks. In 1989, terrorism expert Peter Klerks therefore described the Dutch approach as being a ‘pappen en nathouden’ strategy, meaning it predominantly served ‘to keep things ticking over’. ² If this was indeed the case, was this approach a conscious policy decision? Furthermore, how did this impression become prevalent? In any case, this approach could not be blamed on lack of experience with the terrorism phenomenon. Between 1969–78, several bombings, hostage crises, shootings and other terrorist incidents took place in the Netherlands. In all, 16 people died during these actions, including six terrorists.