ABSTRACT
The structure of the international system during this period has often been depicted as a strategic triangle comprising the United States, the Soviet Union and China. There is some merit in this view, but it should not be exaggerated.1
China did not carry the same strategic weight as the other two and its impact on global configurations of power was still quite limited. The essentials of the Cold War between Moscow and Washington and the centrality of the strategic balance between the two superpowers and their allies remained in place. The principal change that occurred was that China became more openly recognized as a complicating factor in the conduct of American-Soviet relations, especially in East Asia where its influence was more evident. Henry Kissinger’s surprise visit to Beijing in July 1971, which may be said to have formally ushered in this new phase in international politics, did not suddenly elevate China to superpower status. Unlike either of the superpowers, China’s military reach continued to be limited to areas adjacent to its land borders. It lagged far behind in military technology and its economy was not yet of global significance. What gave a new salience to China’s significance was the new strategic weight the Soviet Union had gained as a result of its sustained military build-up while the United States had been bogged down in Vietnam. Now that the Soviet Union had ‘caught up’ with the United States, the China factor acquired a new importance. China’s international strategic importance stemmed first from the fact that
alone of the other countries in the world it claimed to be able to defend itself from either of the superpowers, who in turn had gone to great lengths to contain Chinese power; and second from its independent diplomatic stance as demonstrated by its shift from alliance with the Soviet Union to revolutionary isolationism and now to an alignment with the United States. China also benefited from its geographical location and its perceived potential. But China’s elevation into the diplomacy of tripolarity also stemmed from the importance the two superpowers accorded the country in their conduct of relations with each other. That, however, did not alter the fact that the dominant strategic relationship in world affairs was still that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The key pillars of the Cold War remained in place throughout this period and these emanated from the confrontation in Europe where the Chinese impact was not great.2 The Soviet leaders regarded themselves as representatives of the fellow superpower, with
whom the Americans had to deal over serious issues. As Brezhnev once put it, Nixon went ‘to Peking for banquets but to Moscow to do business’.3
