ABSTRACT
Upon the resurrection of Deng Xiaoping within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978, Chinese rule in Xinjiang exhibited numerous contradictory dynamics. The maelstrom unleashed during the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang had undermined the legitimacy and authority of the CCP, stimulated overt ethnic minority resistance to the ‘fusionist’ policies pursued, and proved catalytic in the stimulation of external pressure along the frontiers. The response of the CCP over the 1976-8 Hua Guofeng ‘interregnum’ was to couple the strengthening of its key instruments of integration and control – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Han in-migration –with a partial return to the rhetoric of the ‘gradualist’ immediate post-liberation era (1949-55) of Party policy concerning ethnic minorities. The potential Soviet threat to Xinjiang during this period once more contributed to the coupling of ‘moderation’ and strengthened integration. Although the Chinese state’s ultimate goal of achieving the integration of Xinjiang remained intact, it was nonetheless placed in significant jeopardy by the legacy of the turbulent vicissitudes of the Mao Zedong era. As Chapter 3 showed, the key contradiction within the CCP leadership both during and after the Maoist period did not concern the goal of integration but rather the strategies, in order to reach this end. The emerging Dengist era would prove to be no different. This period did, however, see the state attempt to utilise the strategic and ‘frontier’ nature of Xinjiang to strengthen the endeavor of integration in contrast to the approaches of the Maoist era that sought the region’s isolation. In retrospect, the 1976-90 period also exhibited the beginnings of a number of dynamics both within Xinjiang and the wider Central Asian region that would challenge Chinese and Russian dominance over the heart of the Eurasian continent.
