ABSTRACT
Despite being a superpower and having one of the largest chemical arsenals in the world, in 1965 the United States was not fully prepared to fight a chemical war. This was particularly true when it came to riot-control agents. At that time, the military did not have a workable doctrine for using tear gas or vomiting agents in combat and, outside of a short exposure during basic training designed to build confidence in his protective mask, the typical combat soldier did not have any experience with these agents. Notwithstanding these limitations, advocates began touting the potential these chemicals offered in the type of war going on in Vietnam. These proponents said the physical characteristics of an agent cloud made it an ideal weapon for a jungle environment, and the non-lethal effects of the agents gave commanders flexibility over the level of force to apply in any given situation. Further, they pointed out that in this conflict the United States faced an enemy with limited technical capabilities, without chemical protective equipment and unable to retaliate in kind. They won their case when the Kennedy Administration began sending riot-control munitions to Vietnam in 1962. Guided by their American advisors, the South Vietnamese were the first to use riot-control agents on the battlefield. The South Vietnamese Army had little success with these weapons, primarily due to its soldiers’ discomfort with this new form of warfare. When US forces entered the chemical war, the Americans fared much better, quickly developing new and innovative tactics that capitalized on the physical and physiological properties of the agents. Initially, the principal hindrance to American operations was the limited selection of available weapons and an inadequate stockpile of munitions. As new armaments arrived, chemical weapons lost their specialty status and they eventually became a normal component of available firepower for American units.
