ABSTRACT
As argued in Chapter 1, unipolarity is distinctive in the sense that the dynamics in play are different than those in other polarities. The fundamental dynamic in international politics in the realist paradigm is considered to be the balance-ofpower dynamic, which selects state strategies and ensures temporary equilibriums within the system. This prevents strong powers from becoming too dominant. The existence of only one superpower logically challenges this dynamic in terms of the incentives it produces. This chapter addresses how the unipolar structure affects the basic balancing incentives. For this purpose, the balancing/ bandwagoning dichotomy is substituted with the flocking/free-riding dichotomy in order to explain how the other states respond to the superior strength of the single superpower in a unipolar system. According to classic neorealism, an anarchically organized system induces power balancing among its units; power balances thus tend to occur and reoccur. The power balances shift according to the redistribution of capabilities. Furthermore, states have the incentive at the strategic level to pursue balancing instead of bandwagoning strategies. The power balancing will predominantly reflect the balancing of the stronger part and is bound to take place regardless of intentions. The relevance of balance-of-power theory has been challenged in recent years due to the emergence of unipolarity (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Levy 2004), the globalization process and new forms of state interaction (Rhodes 2004). Its relevance per se is not discussed in the work at hand, but rather whether balance-of-power theory is as useful regarding unipolarity as it has been regarding other polarities. Moreover, the discussion serves to highlight what is specific to unipolarity as compared to other polarities. In the academic debate on the nature of unipolarity, three questions have been raised in particular. The first question regards whether the balancing of power in general should be considered an operative dynamic in the case of unipolarity. The second question addresses the nature of the strategies states will tend to pursue in a unipolar system. The third question regards whether the United States will be counterbalanced. These questions are also vital for the discussion of the specifics of the balancing of power in the case of unipolarity: the puzzle here is thus whether balancing dynamics remain operative in a unipolar interna-
tional system – and, if so, which forms of balancing should be expected, and what consequences this will have for the US position. Furthermore, Jack Levy has forwarded the argument that, in the case of unipolarity, previous debates over the relationship between intentions and capabilities (Levy 2004: 35) have become redundant due to the strength of the single superpower. Levy referred to Stephen Walt’s qualification of Kenneth Waltz’s balance-of-power hypothesis into one of balance of threat, in which intentions become an explanatory factor that plays a ‘crucial role’ (Walt 1987: 25).
