ABSTRACT
With the Young Ottomans a decade after the Kuleli conspiracy saw the emergence of one of the most famous opposition groups in the history of the Tanzimat. This small group of intellectuals forming in European exile has been credited with many ‘firsts’ in the political history of the Ottoman Empire like the introduction of constitutional thought, the use of newspapers for the dissemination of political ideas and the formation of a modern public opinion based on a political press. Its members have been seen as the intellectual antecedents of the later Young Turks in introducing elements from European political culture to the empire and adapting it to their needs. In their writings the Young Ottomans for the first time came close to developing what might be called ‘political theory’. Here the question of Ottoman legitimacy was posed in a much more articulated manner than before and new political ideas were openly discussed. This also included hints towards a new legitimisation of opposition against the authorities. Such a view has sometimes obscured the fact that the Young Ottomans
were deeply entangled with the power structure and political culture of the empire under Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-76). The description and analysis of a small secret society called Vocation (Meslek) in which some of the Young Ottomans took part will be an example for the political milieu out of which the opposition of the 1860s grew as well as for the style of their opposition. Likewise the configuration of the political system in general is important to understand this opposition. Given the fact that many problems the empire faced were still the same it is not surprising that there were many resemblances and even personal connections to be found to the Society of Martyrs. While historiography has treated the two opposition groups as fundamentally opposed regarding their members, their ideology and their political culture, from within the political system they resembled each other considerably. As has been noted earlier many contemporary dissidents with a Young Ottoman and Young Turk background regarded the plotters of Kuleli as their antecedents. One of the main goals of the men of the Kuleli conspiracy had been to
exchange Abdülmecid for his brother, who, it was generally believed, would have a better grip on his ministers and the problems the empire was facing.
When the sultan died in 1861 and succession brought Abdülaziz to the Ottoman throne the high hopes that were held in the new sultan were frustrated. In terms of the foreign and internal political situation the 1860s remained a decade of an ongoing crisis for the empire. Russia, the big threat to Ottoman sovereignty, had been contained by the Treaty of Paris, but the growing national movements in the Balkans remained a problem. The unification of the two principalities Moldowa and Valachia under one king and the cessation of most Ottoman rights to the new country, Romania, were fought out entirely in the diplomatic arena. In other cases, however, ancient Ottoman rights were disputed more hotly. In Serbia where there were still small detachments of the Ottoman army it came to clashes with the local population. In the beginning of the 1860s there were also minor revolts in Herzegovina, Montenegro and on Crete, all of which could be suppressed. Likewise, in Mount Lebanon the clashes between Druzes and Maronites that spilled over to Damascus provoked French intervention. Unfortunately there is little historical evidence as to the effect these
political developments had on public opinion in Istanbul. The only time popular discontent was voiced openly was during the financial crisis of November 1861. After a dramatic devaluation of the kaime, the Ottoman paper money, there were bread shortages and for a short time it looked as if riots could break out in the capital. With a new loan from Europe, however, confidence could be restored and the kaime was withdrawn from the money market.1
