ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the example of the national security space (NSS) sector in the USA. The rapid and decisive conventional military victories during Operations Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf in 1991, Allied Force Overhead Serbia in 1999, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 were a result of an increasing percentage of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and improving communications connectivity, which are key components of a new US way of war that is empowered by a spaceenabled global reconnaissance, precision strike complex (see Illustrations and Documentation: Table 2.1 Space-Enabled Reconnaissance Strike Complex). A primary goal of the US Department of Defense (DoD) since the end of
the Cold War has been to achieve full spectrum dominance of the battle space by continuing and accelerating military transformation. DoD is developing lighter and more easily deployable forces, which are better able to leverage network-enabled operations and strike more precisely from greater distances against adversaries that may range from emerging military peers to insurgents and terrorists. Space capabilities often provide the best and sometimes the only way to
pursue these ambitious transformational goals. There are, however, many difficult and fundamental issues related to space and defence policy, including: the nature of the fundamental contributions of space to enabling the information revolution and the new US way of war; changes caused by growth in commercial space, the number of major space actors and global proliferation of counterspace capabilities; and the role and efficacy of space capabilities in structuring options for military intervention and in dissuading and deterring competition from potential adversaries in the changed geopolitical environment following the end of the Cold War, the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the USA, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These complex factors contribute to uncertainty about how space cap-
abilities can best advance US national security, the most useful organizational structures to manage and transform space activities themselves, and the utility of investments in space capabilities versus other enabling military capabilities. Moreover, the USA faces significant challenges in its current plans to modernize, improve and replace almost all major military space systems, because most of these systems are essential for future transformed forces, but their acquisition has been marked by cost overruns and deployment delays. It is unclear whether the USAwill be able to find and follow the best path forward
for space strategy, implement the best management and organizational structures for space activities, and sustain the political will needed to continue funding the nearly simultaneous modernizations in space assets currently planned. It is also uncertain whether these new and improved space capabilities can be developed and integrated on cost and on time, and whether these future systems will deliver on their promise of accelerating transformational capabilities and effects. The NSS sector in the USA consists of DoD activities, conducted primarily
by the US Air Force (USAF) to enhance national security, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) programmes to collect intelligence data from space, and civil, commercial and international space activities that support US national security. The NSS sector is divided into separate sectors known as the military or defence space sector, and the intelligence space sector. It is also useful to consider all of the space professionals, training and education, infrastructure, industry and policies that support the NSS sector. Following implementation of one of the recommendations of the January
2001 Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission) report, the DoD now uses an accounting procedure known as the virtual major force programme (vMFP) to track NSS spending, but it is still difficult to follow the NSS budget.1 According to figures provided to the Congressional Research Service, total (classified and unclassified) DoD space spending amounted to US $19.4bn in fiscal year (FY) 2003, $20bn in FY 04, $19.8bn in FY 05 and $22.5bn was requested for FY 06.2 Under the vMFP baseline for NSS procurement and research and development (R&D), unclassified military space acquisition spending grew from $4.9bn to $6.9bn, or more than 40%, between FY 05 and FY 06, rose almost 12% to $7.7bn in FY 07, and then climbed another 13% to $8.7bn for FY 08.3
Overall trends in planned major military space acquisition to 2024 (see Part III: Figure 2.1. Investment in National Security Space Programmes) illustrates the risk of cost growth whereby space acquisition expenditure will peak at $14.4bn in 2010 or almost double present funding if current programmes follow the historic trend of an average 69% rise in costs for space research, development, engineering and testing, as well as an average growth of 19% in space procurement costs.4 Clearly, the path ahead for currently planned NSS improvements and modernizations will be very difficult, if not unsustainable. This problem, along with a number of other daunting shortterm challenges, is discussed after an overview of conceptual frameworks for analysis, a review of major NSS actors and management structures, and current major space acquisition programmes and budgets.
