ABSTRACT
According to a 2007 Gallup poll, less than 20% of U.S. adults accept without doubt the scientific explanation of human origins based in evolutionary biology (Newport, 2008). A much larger percentage of Americans (78%) accept that non-human animals have undergone biological change over time, if the word “evolution” is not included in the question (Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006). These numbers have remained relatively stable for decades despite considerable progress in scientists’ understanding of evolution (Miller et al., 2006). It is important to acknowledge that the numbers do shift depending on how the question is phrased, but the general trend is remarkably consistent. When Gallup put this question to the American public in May, 2007, “Do you, personally, believe in evolution, or not?” it was a statistic dead heat, with 49% responding yes, 48% responding no, and 2% reporting no opinion (Newport, 2008). Many factors contribute to the low rates of acceptance of scientific explanations of biological change in the United States. Biological evolution is a very complex scientific theory. Comprehending the scientific explanation for the history of life on Earth requires developing understandings of concepts from disciplines as diverse as archeology, genetics, heredity, ecology, geology, and probability theory in mathematics. Evolution rests on fundamental, complex ideas that are known to be conceptually challenging for many learners, such as deep time (Dodick & Orion, 2003) and emergent systems theory (Ferrari & Chi, 1998). Developmental psychologists suggest that students may have cognitive constraints or biases such as a strong tendency to think of events as purposeful and caused by intentional agents, such as a supernatural being (Evans, 2000, 2001), that make learning about the content of evolutionary theory particularly challenging. Once these biases are developed they are very difficult to change (Sinatra, Brem, & Evans, 2008; Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003). These conceptual challenges are further complicated by how evolution is typically taught in U.S. public schools, with instruction focusing almost exclusively on micro-evolutionary processes, leaving students with little
understanding of macro-evolutionary processes (Catley, 2006). Making matters more difficult, evolution is viewed as controversial in the United States and therefore curriculum designers, textbook publishers, school administrators, and teachers are under tremendous pressure to de-emphasize the theory and minimize the instructional time spent on the topic (e.g., see Miller, 2008 for the story of one high profile example, the 2006 trial in Dover, PA). Given the limited amount of instructional time devoted to this complex topic in K-12 settings, it is likely that many classroom teachers have had very little exposure to evolutionary theory in their educational experiences. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that many teachers are underprepared to develop or implement effective instruction to teach biological evolution concepts and some evidence suggests that this is indeed the case (Nadelson, 2009; Nadelson & Nadelson, 2010). Each of the obstacles hindering the effective learning and teaching of evolution presents significant challenges to science education, and each deserve considerable research attention. Fortunately, some excellent research has advanced our understanding of these challenges and provides a context for promoting possible solutions (see the other contributions to this volume for many examples). In this chapter we address a different, arguably even more vexing, issue for teaching and learning about biological evolution. We argue that, in the United States in particular, the epistemological boundaries between two ways of understanding and explaining the human experiencescience and religion-are frequently conflated. In the same Gallup poll cited above, when Americans were asked why they do not “believe” in evolution, four of the top five responses were religious in nature. This suggests that many Americans perceive there to be a conflict between their personal or religious epistemologies and the epistemology of science. Indeed, in his new book Only a Theory: Evolution and the Battle for Amer ica’s Soul (Miller, 2008) Kenneth Miller claims that we are at a crossroads. He argues that the leadership in the sciences that Americans have enjoyed for more than a century is at risk of slipping away. He claims that the current debate over evolution “reveals a deep and profound split in the American psyche, an unease that threatens the way we think of ourselves as a people. . .” (p. 16). The risk of blurring the lines between science and religion is that both realms of human experience would be done appreciable harm. The perceived conflict between science and religion has impacted the acceptance of scientific perspectives since the time of Darwin, if not before (e.g., Galileo’s controversy with the church over the movement of the Earth). The conflict has grown more combative at certain times in U.S. history. And, with the emergence of the concept of intelligent design (ID), it appears we are currently in one of those times as Miller asserts (Miller, 2008). Beliefs are compelling systems of thought and they have been found to “trump” knowledge in decision making in many domains, not just science. In a recent book about the effects of lack of knowledge on voter
behavior, Shenkman (2008) laments that “in the absence of knowledge, irrational biases often dictate the policies voters support” (p. 45). Evidence from the psychological literature is replete with examples of biased decision making and reasoning, particularly in the absence of knowledge (see, for example, Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Later, we will describe findings from our research which demonstrate that students’ beliefs are often more predictive of their acceptance of scientific theories than their knowledge of those theories (Sinatra & Southerland, under review; Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). This research, along with a growing body of other evidence, suggests that beliefs play a significant role in the acceptance of scientific constructs such as evolution (Rutledge & Warden, 1999). Given this state of affairs, we propose that the epistemologies of science and religion should be philosophically differentiated to the extent possible to provide learners with a conceptual “place to stand” (Southerland, Sinatra, & Mathews, 2001), particularly for individuals who perceive a conflict between their beliefs and scientific explanations. We posit that there is justification for conceptualizing science and religion as occupying opposite ends of a number of core epistemological continua. We argue that religion and science should not be viewed as conflicting epistemologies; rather they should be viewed as epistemologies that have different roles and explain different aspects of the human condition. The National Academy of Sciences’ most recent publication on science and evolution supports the notion of moving beyond the epistemic divide and states that evolution acceptance can be compatible with religious perspectives (National Academy of Sciences, 2008). The epistemologies of science and religion do differ in important ways-ways which allow both to productively coexist-but these epistemic assumptions are not currently being addressed in most science curricula. If the epistemic assumptions of science and religion are understood, there is no doubt that ID falls outside the bounds of science. We begin this chapter with a discussion of the epistemic continua along which we feel science and religion may be distinguished. We conclude with curricular suggestions for minimizing the perceived “conflict” by explicitly addressing the epistemological commitments and limitations of science.
